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We examine the properties of simple quantity-based monetary policy rules of the kind widely used in 
low-income African economies. Using a DSGE model and focusing our attention on responses to 
positive aid shocks, we suggest that policy rules involving substantial reserve accumulation in the 
face of aid surges serve to ease macroeconomic adjustment to shocks, particularly when a portion of 
aid is used to support fiscal adjustment. These rules are robust to assumptions about the degree of
integration of the domestic public debt market with world capital markets. Although an open capital 
account facilitates smoother adjustment to temporary aid surges when an aid inflow is fully spent, it 
exacerbates the adjustment problem when aid is accompanied by fiscal adjustment and hence 
reinforces the case for a managed float in such circumstances. 
 





* An abridged version of this paper appears in Gill Hammond, Ravi Kanbur and Eswar Prasad (eds) New 
Monetary Policy Frameworks for Emerging Markets: Coping with the Challenges of Financial 
Globalization (Edward Elgar and Bank of England, 2008) 
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1. Introduction 
 
The conduct of monetary policy in Africa has undergone significant changes in the last 
decade.  Shifts in the macroeconomic orthodoxy in favour of tighter fiscal control and the 
emergence of low and stable inflation as a central policy objective of governments across 
the continent have been reinforced by greater institutional independence of central banks 
and a shift away from administrative controls in the foreign exchange and financial 
markets.  Together, these have afforded central banks a degree of protection against 
excessive fiscal pressures and provided them with the instruments with which to pursue 
their inflation targets.  The removal of exchange controls has reduced exchange rate 
policy to choices regarding the degree of flexibility of a unified exchange rate, while the 
shift away from interest-rate controls and directed credit has facilitated a move from 
direct to indirect instruments for controlling overall liquidity, albeit in the context of 
relatively thin and oligopolistic asset markets. 
 
These institutional changes have occurred against a changing macroeconomic 
environment across the continent.  Throughout the early years of this century many 
African central bankers have been confronted by the challenge of managing rapidly rising 
primary export prices which, for those countries that have implemented successful 
adjustment programmes, have often been accompanied by surges in official aid flows.  At 
the same time, and in response to these same developments, strong foreign capital 
inflows have become a feature of the landscape.  These inflows have consisted mainly of 
medium-term FDI flows to natural resource sectors but a significant proportion represents 
short-run portfolio investments in local-currency public debt instruments.  In Zambia, for 
example, foreign investors currently hold around 20% of the stock of domestic 
government bonds (IMF, 2007a) while in December 2006 over 80 percent of the 
Government of Ghana 5-year domestic currency bond was taken up by foreign investors 
(IMF, 2007b).  Similar developments are occurring elsewhere across the continent. 
 
With these factors generating substantial upward pressure on nominal and real exchange 
rates, and given concerns about the possible consequences for external competitiveness, 
central bankers have been increasingly drawn into attempts to prevent the appreciation of 
the real exchange rate which, in turn, raises questions about the degree to which 
intervention should be sterilized and hence the trade-off between exchange rate and 
interest rate volatility.
1  Central bankers across the continent are actively seeking feasible 
monetary rules that provide guidance on how to navigate these concerns about the 
exchange rate without yielding on hard-won inflation gains.  In particular, they are 
                                                 
1  A second concern is that volatile external flows, particularly aid flows, threaten fiscal destabilization as 
aid inflows induce difficult-to-reverse public spending commitments, raising the risk that the fiscal 
authorities will fall back on deficit financing when aid inflows recede. (See Buffie et al, 2008).   3
attempting to determine how aggressively they should seek to manage the path of the 
nominal exchange rate, if at all; whether there is a role for reserves to smooth the 
spending response to aid inflows; and whether aid-related liquidity growth should be 
sterilized through bond sales. 
 
By the end of 2007 only two African countries had sought to resolve these issues by 
committing themselves to fully-fledged inflation targeting.  South Africa adopted 
inflation targeting in 2000 and in May 2007 the Bank of Ghana followed suit by 
announcing the creation of a similar framework.
2  Elsewhere, however, although many 
countries are actively considering moves in the same direction, the vast majority maintain 
what Stone (2003) has labeled ‘inflation targeting lite’ regimes, typically utilizing a 
money-based anchor for inflation.  
 
The distinctions between full-fledged and ‘lite’ regimes are important. The hallmarks of 
strict inflation targeting are a public commitment to inflation as a nominal anchor, in 
preference to the exchange rate or some monetary aggregate, and an explicit prioritization 
of inflation over competing objectives of central bank policy, including output and 
exchange rate stability. By contrast, ‘inflation targeting lite’ regimes typically announce 
an inflation target but may retain exchange rate stability and financial stability among 
their objectives, often reconciled through an IMF-supported financial programming 
framework (see Porter and Yao, 2005).  
 
Operationally, countries that practice strict inflation targeting almost uniformly employ a 
short-term interest rate as the primary policy instrument. For this approach to be effective 
there must be a reliable transmission mechanism from short-term interest rates to 
expected inflation.  Interest rates do not play as central a role in theories of the 
transmission mechanism in most African economies, consistent perhaps with the 
rudimentary nature of the financial sector.  Instead monetary equilibrium plays the key 
role and remains at the core of most programs of monetary management in sub-Saharan 
Africa.  For a given value of expected inflation, the path of velocity is assumed to be 
fixed, rather than dependent on a nominal interest rate, so that the path of the price level 
is then determined endogenously, to equalize the policy-determined path of the nominal 
money supply with the path of real money demand. 
 
Although the choice of operational target often differs sharply between inflation-targeting 
central banks and those based more loosely on financial programming, it does not 
constitute an important analytical difference.  First of all, unavailability of a policy 
interest rate does not rule out the setting of available policy instruments to target expected 
                                                 
2  In May 2007, the Bank of Ghana announced a formal target of 7%-8% per annum for a core inflation 
target which excludes energy and utility prices.   4
inflation to whatever desired degree of transparency and exclusion of other objectives. 
Second, even when a policy interest rate is available, the transmission from monetary 
aggregates to aggregate demand may well be more reliable. Finally, even where a policy 
interest rate does afford reasonably sensitive control over aggregate demand, a given path 
for that rate can in principle be accomplished either directly, by controlling the interest 
rate, or indirectly, by controlling the supply of central bank balances.  
 
The more fundamental difference between these regimes has to do with their choice of 
nominal anchor and the degree to which they prioritize price stability over other 
objectives of monetary policy.  It is these differences which shape the research 
programme discussed in this paper.  This research -- discussed in Buffie et al (2004), 
O’Connell et al (2007) and Adam et al (2008) – is fundamentally concerned with 
integrating these institutional characteristics of African economies into coherent 
macroeconomic models with the ultimate objective of building a bridge between the 
policy frameworks currently in use in most of sub-Saharan Africa and the inflation-
targeting frameworks that form the analytical core of monetary policy among emerging-
market and industrial countries. 
 
This work is ongoing and to date we have framed the policy question rather narrowly in 
terms of the conduct of monetary policy in the face of volatile but persistent positive 
shocks to net aid inflows, such as experienced by a number of countries in sub-Saharan 
Africa since the turn of the century.  Although it readily extends to the analysis of other 
shocks and sources of volatility including in particular commodity price shocks, we retain 
the narrow focus on aid shocks in this paper.
3 
 
Our analysis to date suggests that efficient management of aid inflows requires a degree 
of foreign exchange intervention, particularly in circumstances where aid is used partly to 
substitute for domestic deficit financing and where domestic prices are sticky in a 
downwards direction.  However, these results are derived for an environment where 
countries’ whose integration with global capital markets is rudimentary.  Even though 
many African countries have formally removed controls on capital account transactions, 
access to global capital markets has tended to run predominantly through official aid 
channels and processes of dollarization and currency substitution.  One consequence of 
this is that domestic real interest rates can deviate substantially from world interest-parity 
conditions for extended periods of time. 
                                                 
3  The short-run management of aid surges has become a central policy issue amongst donors and the 
international financial institutions, particularly when set against the background of commitments on the 
part of some donors to scale up aid flows to some of the world’s lowest-income countries. As a result the 
question of efficient macroeconomic management of aid surges has been the subject of much recent work 
by IMF staff including, Gupta et al (2006), Prati and Tressel (2006), Berg et al( 2007) and Peiris and 
Saxegaard (2007).   5
 
We discuss these core results in some detail in this paper.  However, as we have noted 
above, de jure capital account openness has become de facto openness as foreign 
investors have responded to the compression of risk margins by seeking out ever more 
exotic markets including the most under-developed African markets.  To reflect these 
recent developments, we modify our basic closed capital account model to allow for 
capital market integration, albeit limited by considerations of sovereign risk.  We show 
that although an open capital account facilitates smoother adjustment to temporary aid 
surges when an aid inflow is fully spent, volatility is magnified and the adjustment 
problems identified in our earlier work are likely to be exacerbated when aid inflows are 
accompanied by fiscal adjustment. Given this, the case for a managed float in such 
circumstances is strengthened.  The central policy implications in Adam et al (2008) 
appear robust. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2 we briefly set the scene 
and discuss the basic structure of the model.  Section 3 then turns directly to the 
simulations and a discussion of the results. We start with a recapitulation of the principal 
results reported in Adam et al (2008) before turning to the main new contribution of this 
paper which is to examine the robustness of our earlier results to the emergence of 
significant foreign participation in domestic public debt markets. Section 4 concludes. 
 
 
2. The  Model 
 
2.1  Some background considerations  
We develop a dynamic, stochastic general-equilibrium model (DSGE) whose design is 
inspired by the structure of low-income African countries, the shocks that preoccupy 
African central bankers, and the institutional environments they operate within. As a 
result, the model stands in contrast to the contemporary literature on monetary policy in 
emerging-market economies. In particular, reflecting the nature of the transmission 
mechanism, there is no policy interest rate in our model.  Instead, central banks deploy 
balance sheet instruments – foreign exchange reserves, base money and bonds. 
 
In this respect, our model shares more with the earlier literature on monetary 
management in industrial countries (for example, Branson and Henderson 1985) than 
with contemporary approaches.  However, as Woodford (2003) shows, there exists an 
isomorphism between a now-conventional AS-IS-IR model (where IR denotes the 
interest rate rule) and the earlier AS-IS-LM style of model.
4  Thus the choice of model is 
                                                 
4 This is achieved by including the first-order condition for money (i.e. the money demand equation), which 
adds one equation and one variable (money) to the model.   6
a matter of taste but typically will turn on a practical matter of institutions (i.e. whether a 
policy interest rate exists) and, for example, whether velocity is particularly volatile, so 
that the link from money to inflation is less reliable than the link from the policy rate to 
inflation. 
 
This simple equivalence is easily derived for a closed economy.  To move to an open 
economy, an equation for exchange rate determination can be added, possibly by 
assuming UIP as per Svensson (2003) or imperfect asset substitution (as per Ball, 1999 or 
Cespedes et al, 2003).  These extensions typically entail adding a single equation but two 
new variables, the exchange rate and reserves. Overwhelmingly, however, the developed 
country literature conveniently sidesteps the more subtle issue of the added policy 
instrument, reserves, by assuming that the authorities pursue a pure float (which implies 
the change in the instrument, reserves, is zero throughout). 
 
While this may be an appropriate simplification for full-fledged inflation targeting – even 
though many would argue that virtually every countries engages in some intervention, if 
only for ‘technical reasons’– it is patently not a good approximation of reality in 
developing countries in general (see for example Edwards, 2007), and for those of sub-
Saharan Africa in particular where the authorities often reach for exchange rate 
intervention as the first instrument of choice. It is for this reason we include in our model 
explicit rules for foreign exchange intervention, which represent our first main point of 
departure from the literature. 
 
A second and related point is that in our model fiscal policy is not innocuous. With only 
very recent exceptions (e.g., Benigno and Woodford, 2007), analytical treatments of 
inflation targeting tend to assume non-distortionary transfers, so that seigniorage 
requirements do not complicate the management of monetary policy.  In our model, by 
contrast, the management of seigniorage through the interaction of fiscal policy plays 
directly on the private sector’s portfolio behaviour which in turn shapes the dynamic 
adjustment to aid (and other) external shocks. 
 
2.2   Model specification 
This model and its calibration are described in Appendix I and discussed in more detail in 
Adam et al (2008).  Central to the model is a characterization of households’ portfolio 
choices and the financing options facing government which reflects the ‘imperfectly 
open’ capital account structures pervasive in much of Sub-Saharan Africa.  Formally, we 
work with a simple optimizing two-sector dependent economy model with currency 
substitution in which both domestic and foreign currencies delivery liquidity services. 
The representative private agent consumes traded imports and non-traded final goods and 
accumulates financial wealth in the form of three assets: domestic currency, foreign   7
currency and government bonds.
5  There are no banks in the model, so that money is base 
money and foreign currency balances are held in non-interest-bearing forms. 
 
The private agent can accumulate or decumulate foreign currency either via transactions 
with the central bank or through the current account, depending on the exchange rate 
regime.  The private sector’s relative demand for domestic and foreign currencies 
depends on the liquidity services delivered by the assets and on their opportunity costs 
relative to bonds,  t i  and  1 + − t t t x i  respectively, where  t i denotes the domestic nominal 
interest rate and  1 tt x + the expected rate of nominal depreciation.  The sensitivity of 
relative currency demand to these opportunity costs depends on both the elasticity of 
currency substitution and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption (see 
Appendix equations A10 and A11).  The higher the degree of substitutability between 
currencies, for a given value of the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution, the larger the 
desired portfolio reallocation and therefore the greater the pressures on the nominal 
exchange rate in response to shocks. A higher value of the inter-temporal elasticity of 
substitution, other things equal, tends to produce greater volatility in consumption and the 
current account and less volatility in the real interest rate.  The settings adopted in this 
paper correspond to mid-range values from the limited empirical evidence on these 
parameters. When combined with initial steady state values of inflation and the nominal 
interest rates, they imply a steady state inflation elasticity of the demand for money of 
around 0.5 (see Table A1a).
6 
 
In Adam et al (2008) we assume that, aside from the currency substitution channel, 
neither the private nor public sector has direct access to world capital markets.  Hence 
domestic government debt is effectively non-tradable and domestic interest rates are not 
tied down by interest parity conditions.  In this paper we nest this as a special case in a 
more general model which allows for the possibility of foreign portfolio investment in 
African domestic bond markets (although we continue to assume that the government 
does not issue foreign currency debt instruments).  We therefore assume the economy 
faces an upward-sloping foreign supply of funds schedule whose elasticity is determined 
by the premium over uncovered interest parity demanded by foreign investors to 
compensate for sovereign risk.  The foreign investor is assumed to hold a home bond 
whose real yield, denominated in units of the tradable good, is given by 
** (1 ) tt R r =+ .  
                                                 
5 In the current version of the model these are treated as index-linked.  This is consistent with environments 
where debt maturities are extremely short and the stock is turned over rapidly. In many African economies 
the longest maturities actively traded were 91 day bills.  We have, however, also simulated the model under 
the assumption that government issues nominal bonds.  This alters the behaviour of the model but does not 
change the fundamental characteristics of our results. 
6  The sensitivity of our central results to variations in these elasticities is discussed in Adam et al (2008) 
and O’Connell et al (2007).   8
This yield is assumed independent of developments in the local economy.  The foreign 
















.     (1) 
 
where  1 t e + denotes the expected real exchange rate, γ  the non-tradable share in the CPI, 
and  /
f
tt t pby  the value of domestic debt, in units of GDP, held by foreign investors. The 
term  (/ )
f
tt t pb y φ corresponds to the risk premium so that φ  determines the slope of the 
supply schedule.  As φ →∞ the schedule becomes vertical and the model converges on 
the ‘closed’ capital account used in Adam et al (2008). At the other extreme, as  0 φ →  
the supply schedule becomes horizontal at the UIP interest rate, corresponding to the case 
of perfect asset substitutability. 
 
The supply side of the model is simple, reflecting our short run focus.  The economy 
produces exported and non-tradable goods using sector-specific capital, an intermediate 
import (oil) and labour, which is intersectorally mobile.  The aggregate capital stock is 
fixed and there is no investment.  Non-traded goods prices are sticky so that the output of 
non-traded goods is demand-determined in the short run.  In this case, macroeconomic 
adjustment can then take place off the production frontier, via booms or recessions in the 
non-traded goods sector.  
 
The model is completed by defining a stochastic process for the external shocks.  In this 
case we limit the sources of external volatility to stochastic shocks in the net aid inflow.
7  
The aid shock, which follows a stationary AR(1) process around a steady-state mean 
value, is scaled to an equivalent of 2 percent of GDP and is characterized by an 
autoregressive parameter of 0.50. 
 
Policy Rules 
We now turn to the macroeconomic policy choices of interest in the analysis of aid 
shocks.  On the fiscal side, our focus is on the financing implications of fiscal policy, and 
in particular on the consequences of deficit reduction or delayed expenditure out of aid.  
Given the focus of the paper, we assume a high degree of fiscal flexibility which provides 
for a credible imposition of solvency on a continuing basis. 
 
                                                 
7  This simple one-shock structure is nested within a higher dimension structure in which we allow for the 
stochastic determination of commodity export prices, non-tradable output (via rainfall volatility) and 
intermediate input prices (‘oil shocks’).  Given the specific focus on managing aid shocks we suppress 
these other sources of volatility in this paper.   9
Tax rates are held constant throughout so that aid shocks constitute the only source of 
revenue volatility.  Fiscal behaviour is then governed by the level of spending out of aid.
8  
Specifically, a portion δ of aid may be devoted to deficit reduction.  Hence for a given 
aid surge, denoted () t aa − , where a denotes the steady-state level of aid, an amount 
() t aa δ −  is used to substitute for domestic deficit financing and (1 )( ) t aa δ − −  is spent: 
in the simulations reported below, we assume  0 or  0.25 δ δ = = . 
 
Variations in government revenues arising from aid inflows are transferred directly to 
household by means of variation in transfers, net of changes in the cost of providing a 
fixed volume of non-tradable government expenditure arising from changes in the real 
exchange rate. It is possible, however to allow for aid surges to be met by changes in the 
volume of either tradable or non-tradable government expenditure. We explore this 
option in O’Connell et al (2007). 
 
The instruments of monetary policy are transactions in foreign exchange and government 
securities with the private sector.
9  To characterize reserve management, we begin with 
the simplest reaction function that accommodates alternative degrees of commitment to a 
fixed rate of crawl:  ), ( 1 x x z t t − − = Δ α  for  0 1 ≥ α .To this we add a fixed long-run reserve 
target  , z  in order to preserve the stationary structure of the analysis; and – possibly – a 
time-varying reserve target that is tied to the pattern of fiscal spending out of aid. Reserve 








− Δ −− − − ⋅ −
=− − +    (2) 
 
where () t dd − denotes the deviation of government spending net of taxes from its steady 
state level,  , 0 1 ≥ α   , 0 2 > α   }, 1 , 0 { 3 ∈ α  and  . 1 0 ≤ ≤ γ  Here x  is the steady-state rate of 
depreciation, which is tied down by the long-run inflation rate, z  is the steady-state level 
of reserves, and d the steady-state level of net expenditure.  The parameter  1 α  governs 
the degree of commitment to the steady-state rate of crawl.  As  1 α →∞ the regime 
approaches a predetermined crawl in which  t x x =  on a continuous basis.  Lower values 
of  1 α  represent looser commitments to the reference rate of crawl, and for  1 0 α =  the 
exchange rate floats: central bank intervention, if any, is independent of movements in 
                                                 
8  In principal, given this planned level of spending out of aid, the fiscal authorities may choose also to 
smooth the path of spending relative to that of the aid inflow.  Smoothing rules are discussed in Adam et al 
(2008). 
9 With no banking system in model, there is no role for reserve requirements or deposit placement policies 
in the central bank’s toolkit.   10
the nominal exchange rate.
10  In the floating case, all foreign exchange available to the 
economy is immediately priced in a competitive foreign exchange market and either 
added to private foreign currency holdings or absorbed through an increased current 
account deficit.   
 
We refer to the combination of  0 1 = α  and  0 3 = α  as a pure float.  The final term in (2), 
however, allows the central bank to tie foreign exchange sales directly to the path of aid-
induced government spending.  A policy of  , 0 1 = α   3 1 α =  and  1 = γ  corresponds to 
what we call a buffer plus float. This approach is simple and intuitive: the central bank 
sells aid dollars in the precise amount required to finance aid-induced spending as it 
occurs, but floats with respect to all other shocks.
11  In a buffer plus float, any aid that is 
not spent in the current period is retained as reserves. Of course, if  0 = = μ δ  so that aid 
is always spent immediately, there is no operational difference between a buffer plus float 
and a pure float.  In the presence of deficit-reduction or expenditure-smoothing 
components, however, a buffer plus float involves a period of potentially substantial 
reserve accumulation during an aid boom.   
 
Foreign exchange operations are unwound over time, at a rate determined by  2 α .  Since 
private foreign currency holdings return to a steady-state level over time, the long-run 
reserve target implies that aid is ultimately fully absorbed in current account deficits, 
regardless of the time pattern of aid-induced public spending and the other parameters of 
the monetary policy reaction functions. In the simulations reported below, we assume a 
relatively slow rate of adjustment, setting  2 0.05 α =  throughout. 
 
The instruments of monetary policy are completed by the rules governing bond 
operations.  A conventional bond reaction function would define bond operations to 
offset the net impact of domestic credit creation or foreign exchange intervention on the 
monetary base.  In the context of managing liquidity in the face of aid shocks, however, 
policy discussions often centre on a ‘burden sharing’ approach to managing the liquidity 
generated out of aid-induced spending.  To reflect this, we gear bond operations directly 
and solely to spending out of aid and actual foreign exchange intervention (rather than to 
reserve accumulation) to define a bond reaction function of the form 
 
                                                 
10 Equation (2) can be adapted to accommodate a real rather than a nominal exchange rate target by 
replacing the exchange rate term  ) ( x xt −  with () t ee − , where e denotes the real exchange rate.  We do 
not examine this option here, although this case is examined in some detail in Adam et al (2008). 
11 Note that the import component of aid-induced spending (zero in our runs) is self-sterilizing. It generates 
no increase in the monetary base because government deposits decline (and net domestic credit rises) as 
reserves decline.    11
12 1 (1 )( ) ( ). tt t t p bd d b b βγ β − Δ= − − − −      (3) 
 
In this rule,  2 0 β >  allows for a gradual return of bond holdings to a long-run level.
12  It 
is useful to consider (2) and (3) together.  In a pure float or buffer plus float, where  1 = γ  
in the reserve equation (2), the liquidity effect of aid-induced spending is fully offset 
through the sale of aid dollars.  At the other extreme, with  0 γ =  and  31 1 α β == , the 
authorities retain the aid inflow as reserves and sterilize the full aid-spending induced 
liquidity injection through open market operations. Between these two polar extremes, 
the same liquidity injection could be absorbed through any combination of foreign 
exchange and bond sales. For example, in a case we examine below, Berg et al (2007) 
advocate a ’50-50’ approach that allocates half of the task of liquidity management to 
foreign exchange sales and half to bond sales.  In terms of the reaction functions, this 




We start by briefly recapitulating the central results from our earlier work (Adam et al, 
2008) in which we focus on the properties of three monetary policy rules under different 
assumptions about the fiscal response to aid inflows and where government bonds are 
held exclusively by domestic residents.  The first two rules are the polar cases of a pure 
float (i.e. a money anchor) and an exchange rate crawl.  In the former case, official 
foreign exchange reserves are held constant and the growth of the money supply is 
determined exclusively by the actions of the fiscal authorities.  In the latter, the monetary 
authorities target the nominal exchange rate at the steady-state rate of depreciation, with 
changes in the money supply arising from intervention potentially being sterilized 
through bond purchases or sales.
13 The third case, the reserve buffer plus float, entails 
initially accumulating aid inflows as official foreign exchange reserves and then 
sterilizing the full domestic currency counterpart of aid-financed non-import spending 
through foreign exchange sales as it occurs. This rule thus sets a time-varying reserve 
target corresponding to the unspent component of aid, and allows the exchange rate to 
float freely once this reserve target is satisfied. 
 
In section 3.1 we examine the properties of these rules in circumstances where, initially, 
the aid inflow is spent as it is received.  We then examine their performance when a 
portion of the aid inflow is used to substitute for domestic deficit financing.  In Section 
                                                 
12 Ensuring that bonds held by the private sector return to their steady-state level means in turn that interest 
payments and the fiscal deficit are unchanged in the long run. This is required by consistency with the long-
run inflation target. 
13  The steady state rate of crawl is determined by the steady-state rate of inflation required to satisfy the 
government budget constraint.   12
3.2 we re-examine these rules in the presence of an open capital account.  Finally, in 
Section 3.3, we explore the characteristics of ‘burden sharing’ rules that seek to allocate 
responsibility for liquidity sterilization between foreign exchange intervention and bond 
sterilization, under both closed and open capital accounts.  Throughout this analysis we 
eschew any formal welfare comparison, preferring at this stage to focus on the positive 
characteristics of the rules. 
 
3.1.  Aid shocks with a closed capital account 
Table 1 reports the simulated impulse response functions (IRFs) of the key behavioural 
variables of the model in response to a positive aid shock equivalent to 2% of GDP 
(around a steady state mean value of 10% of GDP).  The final column reports the 




When the fiscal authorities spend all the aid inflow as it is received, domestic financing is 
fully and continuously insulated.  In this case, full spending implies there is no distinction 
between a pure float and a buffer plus float.  Both, however, entail a different path for the 
nominal exchange rate and aggregate prices compared to the crawl, at least in the short 
run. The aid inflow induces a mild real exchange rate appreciation consistent with a pro-
cyclical spending boom but while an initial inflationary spike is required under the crawl, 
the initial adjustment is mildly deflationary under a float as the nominal exchange rate 
appreciates. In neither case, however, are the effects large; macroeconomic adjustment is 
largely benign. While the crawl delivers marginally less volatility for both inflation and 
the real exchange rate, and marginally more current account volatility, the differences 
between these polar approaches to exchange rate policy are second-order, at least for the 
parameters of the policy rules considered here.  
 
These similarities disappear when aid is used to provide an element of fiscal stabilization. 
When aid substitutes for seigniorage the monetary authorities are confronted with the 
explicit challenge of how to manage a first-order alteration to the path of domestic 
financing.  Now, the buffer plus float rule is no longer equivalent to a pure float.  The 
pure float implies that the contraction in the fiscal deficit after net budgetary aid is fully 
met by a contraction in the government’s seigniorage requirement for a given stock of 
domestic debt.  As shown in Table 2 (Panel 1), the consequences are dramatic: the 
nominal exchange rate appreciates by more than 13% on impact (compared to an 
appreciation of around 2% in the corresponding no-deficit reduction case reported in 
Table 1), and the real rate appreciates by 8% (again compared to 3%).  These powerful 
price effects induce a contraction in non-tradable output of 0.4% on impact compared to 
                                                 
14 The simulations are generated by the Dynare-Matlab routines (Julliard, 1996) using a first-order Taylor 
approximation to the non-linear model around the non-stochastic steady state.   13
an increase of around the same size in Table 1.  The reason for this outturn is that the 
reduction in expected inflation as a result of the fiscal adjustment shifts the private 
sector’s asset portfolio decisively in favour of domestic money: given the contraction in 
the supply of money and the fact that the authorities are not intervening in the foreign 
exchange market, this requires the nominal exchange rate to overshoot in the short run to 
restore portfolio equilibrium. Since the nominal appreciation is much larger than the real 
appreciation required to absorb the aid inflow, non-tradable prices must fall sharply 
entailing a sharp recession in the non-tradable goods sector if prices are sticky. 
 
Against this counterfactual, strategies that align the absorption of aid more closely to 
spending and hence smooth the path for seigniorage can substantially close off this 
source of macroeconomic volatility.  Both the crawl (Panel 2) and a buffer plus float 
(Panel 3) do rather well in these circumstances. In both cases, but particularly under the 
crawl, the disruptive volatility in inflation and the real exchange rate are greatly reduced.  
The sharp deflationary impact under the pure float is substantially eliminated, with prices 
falling by 3.5% under the buffer plus float and virtually not at all under the crawl, 
compared to a 9% fall under the pure float.  By the same token, the initial real exchange 
rate appreciation is pegged back to around 1.9% under the crawl and 4% under the buffer 
plus float compared to 8% under a pure float and the strong recessionary pressures on 
non-traded output are completely avoided. 
 
These latter rules entail substantial reserve accumulation, and although the patterns of 
accumulation are broadly similar under either rule, as indeed are the real outcomes, the 
two approaches are not the same.  Moreover, the superior performance of the crawl 
observed here is reinforced if the model is re-calibrated to reflect a pre-stabilization 
situation in which inflation is initially higher and the fiscal authorities are more likely to 
direct a proportion of aid towards deficit reduction: in such a setting an aggressive crawl 
is significantly more effective than the buffer plus float strategy. 
 
The reason the crawl contributes to a much smoother adjustment path is that it aligns 
movements in the nominal exchange rate much more closely to the modest real exchange 
rate adjustment required to absorb the aid inflow, while the (unsterilized) liquidity 
injection arising from reserve accumulation forestalls the contraction in the domestic 
money supply observed under the float.  Instead, the increased demand for liquidity as a 
result of the decline in the seigniorage requirement is accommodated without requiring a 
sharp price adjustment so that the economy responds to the aid inflow with virtually 
stable prices. Domestic output is hardly affected, and total private spending follows a 
smoother path.  While the buffer plus float strategy goes some way to delivering this 
same outcome it does so less efficiently since it involves reserve accumulation with 
respect to the unspent portion of aid only – thereby serving to efficiently match the   14
supply of domestic money – but does not fully accommodate changes in the demand for 
domestic money arising from the fall in expected inflation.  In the simulations reported in 
Table 2, for example, the buffer plus float entails rather more up-front intervention than 
the crawl but rather less over the remainder of the simulation.  As the inflation elasticity 
of the demand for money rises, this distinction becomes more marked and the buffer plus 
float does less well in aligning the demand and supply of domestic liquidity compared to 
the float. 
 
3.3  Aid shocks with an open capital account 
These simulations suggest that when deficit-reduction considerations are important, 
active foreign exchange intervention with little or no sterilization of increases in the 
monetary base serves to accommodate changed in the increased demand for money 
associated with declining inflation and delivers a more attractive way of smoothing 
macroeconomic volatility than relying on a pure float.  These results assume, however, 
that domestic asset markets are fully insulated from the rest of the world.  In the next 
section we consider whether these results remain pertinent as the capital account is 
liberalized de facto.  
 
Tables 3 and 4 illustrate the impact of incorporating foreign participation in the domestic 
public debt market.  Drawing on the recent experience of countries such as Zambia and 
Ghana we assume that foreign investors hold 15 percent of debt in the initial steady state 
(equivalent to 1% of GDP). We allow for a modest elasticity with respect to the country 
risk premium by setting  0.15 φ = .  There are, to the best of our knowledge, no reliable 
estimates of this parameter, but preliminary sensitivity analysis with our model suggest 
that the qualitative characteristics of our results are monotonic in  . φ  
 
In the case where all aid is spent as it is received, integration with world capital markets 
via foreign bond holders allows for smoother aggregate adjustment to the aid shock than 
was previously the case.  The results are sufficiently similar under a float / buffer plus 
float and the crawl in this case that it suffices to report only the results for the pure float. 
Relative to the closed capital account case, adjustment entails significantly more muted 
movements in domestic nominal and relative prices, while the short run boom in 
aggregate consumption and non-traded output is substantially eliminated.  These 
smoother paths for consumption and production are facilitated by larger current account 
adjustments. With an open capital account, the private sector’s consumption is less pro-
cyclical as it can now smooth more efficiently over the temporary aid flow by indirectly 
accumulating net foreign assets via the bond market.
15  In the limiting case shown in 
panel 2 of Table 3, where we allow  0 φ → , so that the economy’s financial terms of trade 
                                                 
15 In terms of the model, and given that total bonds are fixed in supply, the private sector accumulates 
claims on government which in turn amortizes an equivalent volume of bonds held by the foreign investor.   15
are invariant to the shock, the economy follows a textbook adjustment to a temporary 
income shock (recalling that the data-generating process for the aid shock is known to the 
private sector).  The real interest rate does not move and consumption adjusts rapidly and 




The results in Table 3 give the impression that greater capital account openness creates an 
important additional degree of freedom for efficient adjustment to external shocks and 
that this necessarily smooths the adjustment path for the economy.  As the results in 
Table 4 suggest, however, this is false when some fraction of the aid inflow is used for 
deficit reduction purposes: if anything, the open capital account raises the stakes.  In this 
case the open capital account exacerbates the adjustment problem under the float and 
accentuates the wedge between the float on the one hand and the crawl and buffer plus 
crawl on the other.   This is seen most clearly if we focus on the costs of the real 
exchange rate appreciation for the non-traded sector.  Previously, the limited capacity of 
the private sector to acquire foreign assets ensured that aggregate consumption was quite 
strongly pro-cyclical, and this in turn limited the contractionary effects of real exchange 
rate appreciation on the non-traded sector.  With a more open capital account, however, 
the private sector is better placed to smooth aggregate consumption with the result that 
aggregate demand effects provide less support to the non-traded sector, exposing it to a 
much sharper contraction than before. 
 
By contrast, the properties of the crawl and buffer plus float strategies, in which reserve 
accumulation serves to avoid nominal and real exchange rate overshooting, change 
relatively little when we allow for foreign participation in domestic debt markets.  As 
such, the relative benefits from pursing these strategies over the pure float, in terms of 
facilitating a smooth macroeconomic adjustment to deficit-reducing aid shocks, are 
further enhanced in the presence of a more open capital account. The central insights 
from our earlier work are preserved  and even reinforced when the capital account is open 
n open capital account: when aid is used to substitute for seigniorage the incipient 
portfolio adjustment by the private sector in response to changes in expected inflation 
will dominate macroeconomic dynamics and ensure that efficient adjustment to 
temporary aid surges entails a fairly heavy degree of unsterilized foreign exchange 
intervention, either under an explicit exchange rate crawl or through the operation of a 
buffer plus float rule.  This result is not surprising. The fundamental factor underpinning 
the volatility observed when the domestic government debt market is closed is the 
domestic private sector’s incipient portfolio adjustment, between domestic and foreign 
                                                 
16  The one-period aid shock is equivalent to 2% of GDP and has an autoregressive parameter of 0.5 
implying a present value the aid shock is equivalent to 4% of GDP which implies an annuity value of 
0.3636 percent of GDP at the steady-state real interest rate of 10%.   16
currency.  Opening the domestic debt market serves to anchor the real return on debt, 
which may have important implications for interest sensitive expenditure in the public 
and private sectors, but given that bonds do not generate liquidity services (or, in an 
alternative set-up, satisfy cash in advance constraints) the open capital account by itself 
does not eliminate the domestic agent’s portfolio problem.  
 
3.3.  Burden-sharing and bond sterilization  
The discussion so far has focused on monetary policy from the perspective of alternative 
degrees of commitment to a floating exchange rate.  In doing so, we have seen how the 
crawl and buffer plus float each end up allocating 100 percent of the burden of liquidity 
control to foreign exchange sales.  Macroeconomic adjustment is smooth, suggesting that 
there is no obvious case for shifting any of the burden to bond operations.  In practice, 
however, central banks in Africa often feel compelled to adhere to strict monetary targets 
and match intervention with active bond sterilization.  This is particularly so in the 
context of the IMF-supported financial programmes, most of which are predicated on the 
assumption of a constant velocity of circulation over the short to medium term.  Table 5 
illustrates the case where the domestic currency value of aid spending is exactly matched 
by sales of foreign exchange and government securities in the share [, 1 ] γ γ − .  In the case 
of ‘full bond sterilization’,  0 γ = and for the ’50:50’ rule  0.5 γ = . 
 
In either case, these sterilization rules are decisively dominated by the buffer plus float 
and crawl which rely on foreign exchange sales alone to manage domestic liquidity 
growth for aid-funded spending.  Panels 1 and 2 of Table 5 illustrate the case in which aid 
is fully spent – so that seigniorage requirements are stationary.  In this case, bond 
sterilization, whether partial or full, merely imparts a substantial dose of conventional 
‘unpleasant arithmetic’, with higher domestic debt service costs contributing to persistent 
domestic inflation over the horizon and a steady depreciation in the nominal exchange 
rate.  Moreover, as the memorandum items to Table 5 indicate, the real interest rate (RIR) 
and the budget deficit (def) under bond sterilization are both substantially higher than 
under the comparable buffer plus float run reported in Table 1. 
 
Opening the capital account does little to alter this picture.  As the comparison of Panels 
2 and 3 indicates, the adjustment path for the economy is virtually unchanged beyond the 
change in the composition of debt holdings arising from the sterilization rule.  The path 
for the real interest rate is pegged slightly tighter to the foreign bond rate (adjusted for the 
expected real exchange rate appreciation), debt service costs are consequently marginally 
lower across the response horizon and the paths for inflation and the real exchange rate 
very slightly smoother.  But overall, these differences are nugatory.  Moreover, the 
results do not change substantially as the elasticity of the foreign bond supply increases: 
even with a perfectly open capital account the same outcomes prevail for this particular   17
shock and response.  The reason is that the sterilization rule in operation here -- where the 
bond issue is conditioned directly and exclusively on the fiscal response to the aid shock 
– is invariant to the evolution of the intermediate target such as reserve money or indeed 
to the evolution of inflation.  As such, the chosen volume of sterilization is independent 
of capital market conditions so that the fiscal burden of sterilization varies only in terms 
of the variations in the real interest rate which, as noted changes relatively little with 
changes in the elasticity of foreign bond supply.  Indeed, as the results presented in Table 
5 show, this particular rule does not do a particularly good job in controlling inflation.  
To fully understand the consequences of capital account liberalization on the properties 
of sterilization rules, including the implications for the offset between bond sterilization 
and the path of reserves, requires an examination of a wider range of settings for the 
intervention and bond reaction functions, a task beyond the scope of this paper.  
 
4.  Conclusions and next steps 
 
We argued at the beginning of this paper that central bankers in Africa face substantial 
problems in managing aid surges. In practice, many appear to have adopted strategies 
involving substantial intervention and reserve accumulation in response to aid surges, 
accompanied in many cases by fairly aggressive bond sterilization. Our simulations 
suggest that when currency substitution is active, this pattern is consistent with an 
efficient monetary policy response to an aid surge, and particularly so when a portion of 
the aid will be used for inflation stabilization.  Conditional on these portfolio effects, 
however, there is essentially no role for bond sterilization during an aid surge, at least 
when the capital account is closed.  Moreover, we find that the relative properties of the 
alternative rules are robust to relaxing the assumption that the domestic bond market is 
entirely closed to external influences. We show that while foreign participation in the 
domestic bond market allows for more efficient adjustment when aid flows are fully 
spent, this does not carry over to the case in which aid alters the trajectory for domestic 
deficit financing. In the latter case, foreign bondholders exacerbate the short-run tradeoffs 
facing the monetary authority and strengthen the appeal of temporary reserve 
accumulation. 
 
Monetary policy has a complex mandate in Sub-Saharan Africa, where conventional 
objectives of macroeconomic stability coexist with an interest in facilitating the 
development of financial markets. While we have emphasized the appeal of temporary 
reserve accumulation in the face of an aid surge, there is a sharp divergence between how 
this is accomplished under a crawl and a buffer plus float. In a crawl, the monetary 
authority targets the exchange rate, while in a buffer plus float intervention coincides 
with aid-financed spending in a version of reserve-money targeting. The two approaches 
have widely divergent implications for how the exchange rate responds to other shocks,   18
and therefore for the patterns of volatility facing portfolio holders (and their assumptions 
regarding the nominal anchor). Our current DSGE treats the parameters of portfolio 
behavior as exogenous to these variations in monetary policy behavior. We are therefore 
ignoring any impact of alternative rules on the trajectory of financial market 
development. This is an important area for further work. 




Table 1: Impulse Response Functions to Stochastic Aid Shock 
 
All aid is spent as received 
 
Closed Capital Account 
 
                                       Aid Shock (% GDP) 
 
Variable      0         1         2         3         4         5        15      Stdev 
 
a          2.000     1.000     0.500     0.250     0.125     0.063     0.000     2.320 
 
Panel 1: Pure Float [= buffer plus float] 
 
NER       -2.217    -1.092    -0.800    -0.484    -0.285    -0.168    -0.001     2.698 
RER        2.941     3.346     2.985     2.351     1.730     1.222     0.019     6.598 
I         -0.659    -2.804    -2.388    -1.670    -1.117    -0.736    -0.010     4.500 
RIR       -1.680    -1.172    -0.685    -0.389    -0.222    -0.128    -0.001     2.246 
IN        -0.599    -0.869    -0.999    -0.833    -0.626    -0.448    -0.007     1.980 
ca         0.770     0.088    -0.128    -0.172    -0.155    -0.122    -0.002     0.817 
C          1.725     1.076     0.623     0.359     0.208     0.123     0.001     2.202 
DN         0.550     0.182    -0.005    -0.070    -0.080    -0.068    -0.001     0.587 
 
Panel 2: Crawl 
 
NER        0.203    -0.169    -0.179    -0.134    -0.093    -0.065    -0.022     0.447 
RER        1.989     2.574     2.391     1.932     1.448     1.036     0.020     5.134 
I          1.427    -1.476    -1.544    -1.212    -0.866    -0.597    -0.032     3.093 
RIR       -1.494    -1.123    -0.715    -0.429    -0.251    -0.146    -0.001     2.110 
IN         1.297     0.152    -0.280    -0.386    -0.359    -0.291    -0.027     1.492 
ca         0.880     0.142    -0.102    -0.156    -0.143    -0.113    -0.003     0.914 
C          1.690     1.112     0.678     0.402     0.236     0.139     0.002     2.226 
DN         0.634     0.283     0.085    -0.004    -0.036    -0.040    -0.001     0.696 
 
Notes: 
See Appendix Tables A1 and A1b for description of variables. 
An increase in NER represents a depreciation; an increase in RER an appreciation.  20
Table 2: Impulse Response Functions to Stochastic Aid Shock 
 
25% of aid inflow devoted to domestic deficit reduction 
 
Closed Capital Account 
 
                                       Aid Shock (% GDP) 
 
Variable   0         1         2         3         4         5        15      Stdev 
 
a          2.000     1.000     0.500     0.250     0.125     0.063     0.000     2.320 
 
 
Panel 1: Pure Float. 
 
NER      -13.352    -1.304    -1.001    -0.602    -0.348    -0.201    -0.002    13.253 
RER        7.747     5.750     4.246     3.029     2.101     1.428     0.020    11.656 
I        -10.000    -2.941    -2.675    -1.865    -1.235    -0.806    -0.010    11.097 
RIR       -0.271    -0.604    -0.424    -0.264    -0.161    -0.099    -0.001     0.879 
IN        -9.091    -2.402    -1.828    -1.271    -0.858    -0.571    -0.008     9.731 
ca         0.837     0.085    -0.142    -0.186    -0.166    -0.130    -0.002     0.885 
C          0.768     0.663     0.430     0.266     0.164     0.101     0.001     1.180 
DN        -0.439    -0.279    -0.236    -0.189    -0.141    -0.101    -0.002     0.654 
dZ         0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000 
 
Panel 2: Crawl 
 
NER       -0.862    -0.541    -0.368    -0.253    -0.184    -0.145    -0.093     1.592 
RER        1.889     2.269     2.035     1.612     1.195     0.851     0.029     4.457 
I          0.194    -1.702    -1.465    -1.102    -0.793    -0.566    -0.108     3.056 
RIR       -1.216    -0.835    -0.517    -0.307    -0.180    -0.106    -0.001     1.636 
IN         0.176    -0.331    -0.497    -0.485    -0.414    -0.335    -0.097     1.523 
ca         1.113     0.334     0.034    -0.066    -0.085    -0.077    -0.005     1.155 
C          1.285     0.816     0.493     0.293     0.175     0.105     0.004     1.666 
DN         0.442     0.167     0.030    -0.025    -0.040    -0.038    -0.001     0.472 
dZ         0.470     0.271     0.164     0.093     0.051     0.027    -0.003     0.587 
 
 
Panel 3: Buffer plus float 
 
NER       -5.687    -1.574    -1.513    -1.264    -1.074    -0.943    -0.487     6.907 
RER        3.951     3.560     2.961     2.289     1.695     1.229     0.120     7.220 
I         -3.865    -3.141    -3.025    -2.403    -1.890    -1.520    -0.547     7.664 
R         -1.066    -0.907    -0.551    -0.317    -0.183    -0.106    -0.002     1.585 
IN        -3.514    -1.790    -1.843    -1.633    -1.400    -1.200    -0.495     5.845 
ca         0.919     0.183    -0.067    -0.136    -0.137    -0.116    -0.015     0.957 
C          1.279     0.867     0.517     0.304     0.181     0.111     0.007     1.701 
DN         0.220     0.055    -0.056    -0.091    -0.089    -0.075    -0.009     0.290 




See Table 1.   21
Table 3: Impulse Response Functions to Stochastic Aid Shock 
 
All aid spent as received 
 
Open Capital Account 
 
                                       Aid Shock (% GDP) 
 
Variable   0         1         2         3         4         5        15      Stdev 
 
a          2.000     1.000     0.500     0.250     0.125     0.063     0.000     2.320 
 
 
Panel 1: Pure Float 
[Imperfect Capital Mobility phi=0.15] 
 
NER       -1.329    -0.124    -0.085    -0.060    -0.045    -0.036    -0.009     1.320 
RER        1.959     2.277     2.297     2.178     2.002     1.810     0.550     6.607 
I         -0.277    -0.338    -0.372    -0.363    -0.337    -0.306    -0.093     1.077 
RIR       -0.358    -0.264    -0.204    -0.165    -0.137    -0.117    -0.033     0.612 
IN        -0.252     0.051    -0.074    -0.126    -0.142    -0.141    -0.048     0.486 
ca         1.365     0.528     0.125    -0.060    -0.139    -0.166    -0.065     1.528 
C          0.812     0.674     0.572     0.494     0.430     0.377     0.110     1.668 
DN         0.198     0.096     0.042     0.016     0.003    -0.003    -0.003     0.226 
bp         1.140     1.581     1.684     1.632     1.516     1.377     0.421     4.842 
bf        -1.140    -1.581    -1.684    -1.632    -1.516    -1.377    -0.421     4.842 
dz         0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000 
 
 
Panel 2: Pure Float 
[Perfect Capital Mobility phi=0.001] 
 
NER       -1.060    -0.044    -0.009     0.005     0.010     0.013     0.014     1.056 
RER        1.258     1.425     1.492     1.518     1.527     1.529     1.502    19.888 
I         -0.405    -0.050    -0.013     0.002     0.008     0.010     0.012     0.431 
R         -0.094    -0.039    -0.017    -0.008    -0.004    -0.003    -0.002     0.105 
IN        -0.368     0.048     0.027     0.019     0.015     0.014     0.012     0.397 
ca         1.665     0.830     0.411     0.202     0.098     0.045    -0.006     1.931 
C          0.389     0.353     0.337     0.331     0.328     0.326     0.319     4.236 
DN         0.061     0.025     0.010     0.004     0.002     0.001     0.000     0.067 
bp         1.595     2.397     2.797     2.995     3.091     3.136     3.123    41.242 
bf        -1.595    -2.397    -2.797    -2.995    -3.091    -3.136    -3.123    41.242 
dz         0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000 
 
Notes: See Table 1.   22
Table 4: Impulse Response Functions to Stochastic Aid Shock 
 
25% of aid inflow devoted to domestic deficit reduction 
 
Open Capital Account 
 
                                       Aid Shock (% GDP) 
 
Variable   0         1         2         3         4         5        15      Stdev 
 
a          2.000     1.000     0.500     0.250     0.125     0.063     0.000     2.320 
 
 
Panel 1: Pure Float 
[Imperfect Capital Mobility phi=0.15] 
 
NER      -12.469    -0.409    -0.241    -0.145    -0.091    -0.060    -0.009    12.211 
RER        6.735     4.674     3.527     2.828     2.360     2.018     0.561    10.946 
I         -9.641    -0.653    -0.557    -0.472    -0.404    -0.349    -0.097     9.567 
RIR        0.949     0.366     0.100    -0.019    -0.068    -0.085    -0.034     1.040 
IN        -8.765    -1.542    -0.872    -0.529    -0.348    -0.248    -0.050     8.876 
ca         1.436     0.534     0.122    -0.068    -0.148    -0.175    -0.067     1.597 
C         -0.149     0.217     0.358     0.396     0.389     0.363     0.112     1.138 
DN        -0.789    -0.388    -0.195    -0.102    -0.056    -0.033    -0.004     0.914 
bp         1.118     1.608     1.726     1.675     1.555     1.411     0.423     4.932 
bf        -1.118    -1.608    -1.726    -1.675    -1.555    -1.411    -0.423     4.932 
dz         0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000 
 
Panel 2: Crawl 
[Imperfect Capital Mobility phi=0.15] 
 
 
NER       -1.101    -0.425    -0.253    -0.169    -0.128    -0.107    -0.084     1.576 
RER        1.436     1.794     1.819     1.712     1.560     1.400     0.421     5.112 
I         -0.342    -0.632    -0.497    -0.416    -0.363    -0.324    -0.156     1.718 
RIR       -0.347    -0.213    -0.150    -0.118    -0.099    -0.086    -0.025     0.512 
IN        -0.311    -0.228    -0.239    -0.228    -0.212    -0.195    -0.114     1.234 
ca         1.509     0.642     0.213     0.011    -0.079    -0.114    -0.052     1.679 
C          0.643     0.509     0.427     0.369     0.323     0.285     0.085     1.273 
DN         0.169     0.064     0.020     0.003    -0.004    -0.006    -0.002     0.181 
bp         0.908     1.204     1.268     1.224     1.134     1.028     0.308     3.636 
bf        -0.908    -1.204    -1.268    -1.224    -1.134    -1.028    -0.308     3.636 
dz         0.601     0.202     0.098     0.047     0.022     0.010    -0.003     0.643 
 
 
Panel 3: Buffer plus float 
[Imperfect Capital Mobility phi=0.15] 
 
NER       -4.901    -0.727    -0.865    -0.888    -0.867    -0.832    -0.493     5.817 
RER        3.084     2.622     2.352     2.135     1.935     1.746     0.582     7.123 
I         -3.526    -0.982    -1.205    -1.245    -1.213    -1.155    -0.619     5.550 
R          0.089    -0.082    -0.125    -0.126    -0.114    -0.101    -0.029     0.337 
IN        -3.205    -0.981    -1.013    -1.007    -0.977    -0.936    -0.530     4.831 
ca         1.444     0.568     0.153    -0.041    -0.125    -0.156    -0.069     1.613 
C          0.473     0.508     0.476     0.428     0.379     0.335     0.102     1.320 
DN        -0.091    -0.024    -0.012    -0.013    -0.016    -0.018    -0.011     0.114 
bp         1.003     1.397     1.481     1.429     1.322     1.199     0.373     4.241 
bf        -1.003    -1.397    -1.481    -1.429    -1.322    -1.199    -0.373     4.241 
dz         0.500     0.225     0.089     0.022    -0.011    -0.026    -0.026     0.572 
 
 
Notes: See Table 1. 
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Table 5: Impulse Response Functions to Stochastic Aid Shock 
 
Float with Partial Bond sterilization 
 
                                       Aid Shock (% GDP) 
Variable   0         1         2         3         4         5        15      Stdev 
 
a          2.000     1.000     0.500     0.250     0.125     0.063     0.000     2.320 
 
Panel 1: All aid spent as received 
 
Full Bond Sterilization: closed capital account 
 
NER       31.481     6.441     7.633     7.413     7.017     6.628     3.906    40.698 
RER      -12.953    -7.205    -4.336    -2.520    -1.316    -0.525     0.649    16.227 
I         26.792     9.351    10.741     9.771     8.749     7.925     4.244    41.208 
RIR       -1.102     0.554     0.471     0.274     0.141     0.062    -0.034     1.320 
IN        24.357     9.603     9.211     8.412     7.679     7.063     3.893    37.447 
ca         3.128     1.812     0.920     0.397     0.098    -0.070    -0.210     3.926 
C          0.201    -0.224    -0.010     0.171     0.277     0.332     0.269     1.472 
DN         1.477     0.653     0.455     0.353     0.278     0.222     0.066     1.820 
db         2.000     0.900     0.355     0.087    -0.042    -0.103    -0.103     2.288 
db         2.000     0.900     0.355     0.087    -0.042    -0.103    -0.103     2.288 
dbf        0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000 
dz         2.000     0.900     0.355     0.087    -0.042    -0.103    -0.103     2.288 
def        2.054     1.714     1.182     0.823     0.603     0.467     0.170     3.350 
 
 
Panel 2: All aid spent as received 
 
50:50 bond and foreign exchange sterilization: closed capital account 
 
NER       14.632     2.674     3.417     3.464     3.366     3.230     1.952    19.230 
RER       -5.006    -1.929    -0.676    -0.084     0.207     0.349     0.334     5.670 
I         13.067     3.274     4.177     4.051     3.816     3.594     2.117    19.207 
RIR       -1.391    -0.309    -0.107    -0.058    -0.040    -0.033    -0.017     1.417 
IN        11.879     4.367     4.106     3.789     3.526     3.308     1.943    17.973 
ca         1.949     0.950     0.396     0.112    -0.028    -0.096    -0.106     2.279 
C          0.963     0.426     0.306     0.265     0.243     0.227     0.135     1.381 
DN         1.014     0.418     0.225     0.141     0.099     0.077     0.032     1.151 
db         1.000     0.450     0.178     0.044    -0.021    -0.051    -0.051     1.144 
dbp        1.000     0.450     0.178     0.044    -0.021    -0.051    -0.051     1.144 
dbf        0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000 
dz         1.000     0.450     0.178     0.044    -0.021    -0.051    -0.051     1.144 
def        2.021     1.208     0.707     0.434     0.290     0.213     0.084     2.591 
 
Panel 3: All aid spent as received 
 
50:50 bond and foreign exchange sterilization: imperfectly open capital account 
 
NER       14.428     2.467     3.181     3.363     3.336     3.227     1.957    18.988 
RER       -4.825    -1.763    -0.570    -0.095     0.103     0.194     0.322     5.427 
I         12.952     2.755     3.557     3.753     3.711     3.580     2.139    18.871 
R         -1.647    -0.603    -0.213    -0.071    -0.022    -0.007    -0.011     1.757 
IN        11.774     4.151     3.837     3.624     3.445     3.277     1.955    17.749 
ca         1.831     0.880     0.374     0.123    -0.002    -0.063    -0.097     2.135 
C          1.150     0.514     0.281     0.199     0.172     0.163     0.134     1.483 
DN         1.087     0.444     0.201     0.110     0.075     0.061     0.033     1.211 
db         1.000     0.450     0.178     0.044    -0.021    -0.051     0.001     1.144 
bp         0.774     0.387     0.210     0.105     0.039    -0.001    -0.001     6.321 
bf         0.226     0.097    -0.032    -0.062    -0.060    -0.051     0.002     0.802 
dz         1.000     0.450     0.178     0.044    -0.021    -0.051    -0.051     1.144 
def        2.237     1.087     0.528     0.255     0.120     0.053    -0.016     2.571 
 
Memo:  Impulse Response and std. dev for real interest rate deficit under pure float 
 
RIR       -1.680    -1.172    -0.685    -0.389    -0.222    -0.128     -0.001     2.246 
def        1.855     0.836     0.353     0.134     0.040     0.002     -0.001     2.067 
 
Notes: 
See Table 1.   24
 
Appendix I: The baseline simulation model 
This appendix outlines the basic structure of the core simulation model.  The full set of 
calibration parameters is reported in Table A1a and the variables to be tracked in the 
simulations in Table A1b. 
 
A1. Household preferences 
















+ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ −− ⎝⎠
∑ Ε       ( A 1 )  
 
where τ  is the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution;
1 ) 1 (
− + ≡ ρ β  the discount factor 
Εthe expectations operator. C  and L are CES functions of the underlying goods and 
currencies: 
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   (A3) 
 
and h is a scaling parameter calibrated by the data. 
 
Household budget constraint 
Nominal household financial wealth, W, acquired in period t is given by 
 
P
tt t t t t WMP bE f =+ +       ( A 4 )  
 
where M and f denote end-of-period stocks of domestic and foreign currency balances, E 
the nominal exchange rate and P is an exact consumption-based price index.
17. Domestic 
debt, represented by CPI-indexed bonds, is defined 
 
pf
tt t bbb = +       ( A 5 )  
 
                                                 
17 Given the CES structure for the consumption aggregate,  () . 1
1
1 1 α α α α α − − − + = It I Nt N t P k P k P    25
where  
P
t b is held by the domestic household and 
f
t b by the foreign investor.  Nominal 




ttt t t t ttt t t WM R P b E f YT RP C −− − − =+ + + − −      (A6) 
 
where  t Y  denotes income from production,  ) ( It It Nt Nt t t c P C P C P + =  is nominal 
consumption expenditure and  t TR  taxes net of transfers.  The real interest rate is pre-
determined so that  1 1 1 − − + = t t r R  is the real interest factor applicable to bonds carried over 
from period t–1. 
 
The model is analysed in terms of the imported good.  PPP holds for traded goods. By 
normalizing the foreign price of importables to 1, and lower-case letters denote stocks or 
flows measured in terms of imported goods.  Define  1 / 1 − = + = Π t t t t P P π  and 
1 / 1 − = + = t t t t E E x X  as the inflation and exchange rate factors,  / tN t t ePE ≡  as the real 
exchange rate, the real return on bonds in terms of importables as 
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First Order Conditions 
The first order conditions consist of, along with the standard transversality condition, the 
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and the domestic and foreign currency demand conditions 
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A2. Aggregate  supply 
For fixed capital endowments, aggregate domestic output is  
 
/(1 ) (1 )/ (1 )/ (1 ) NX QQ Q
η η ηη ηη δδ
+ ++ ⎡⎤ =+ − ⎣⎦      (A12) 
 
where η is the long-run elasticity of transformation between tradable and non-tradable 
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     (A13) 
 
where 
X p denotes the (stochastic) world price of tradables, 
O p denotes the world oil price 
(where oil is the only intermediate input in production) and  and  N X ω ω are input-output 
coefficients for the non-tradable and tradable sectors respectively. 
 
Non-tradable prices 
Prices of tradables are fully flexible. By contrast, Calvo-pricing prevails in the non-
tradable goods market. The price level chosen by adjusting firms in period t satisfies  
 
*
,1 log [1 (1 ) ]log (1 ) log
AA




, log N tk P +  is the target (log) price in t+k, and Γthe discount factor. Since a 
proportion λ  of (the large number of) firms ends up changing prices in period t, the 
aggregate price level for non-traded goods satisfies 
 
,1 log log (1 )log
A
NtN t N t PP P λλ − =+ −      ( A 1 5 )  
   27
Optimal price for non-traded goods is a function of the aggregate price level and the gap 
between the output of non-traded goods and their supply at full employment. 
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These three equations yield the sector-specific Phillips Curve  
 
,1 ,1
(, ) ( )
log log [log log ]
()
Nt t t Nt Nt N Xt
Nt N t t N t Nt
Nt N Xt








−= Γ − + ⋅ ⎢ ⎥
⎣ ⎦
 (A17) 





≡− − Γ >
−
  High values of ψ  imply greater price flexibility, and 
as  ∞ → ψ  equation (A17) approaches the flexible-price market-clearing condition in the 
non-traded goods market,  . ) , ( ) ( Nt t t Nt Xt N Nt G C e C e Q + = ϕ  To ensure that the Natural Rate 
Hypothesis holds, we impose  1 Γ= . 
 
A3. The  public  sector 
The central bank’s balance sheet, in nominal terms is given as: 
 
C
tt t t t M Ez Pb Δ= Δ + Δ       ( A 1 8 )  
 
Assuming the central bank transfers its operating surplus to government (i.e. interest on 
govt securities are remitted to government) 
 
11 1 () ( )
PfC P f
tt t t N t N tt I tt tt t tt t Pb b b P G E g Pr b b TR Ea −− − Δ+ Δ+ Δ = + + + − −    (A19) 
 
where   and  NtI t G g denote quantities of government consumption of non-tradables and 
tradables, respectively, and a denotes net aid inflows, measured in the world price of 
imports. The consolidated public sector budget constraint in terms of importables 
becomes  
() 1 1
x pf t mpb b zda m ttt t ttt t xt
Δ+ Δ+ Δ − Δ =−− − +      (A20) 
 
where, letting  tt N tI t g eG g =+ ,   11 1 ()
pf
tt tt t t t d g tp r b b −− − ≡− + +  is the fiscal deficit before 
aid.  Public sector behaviour is described in section A5. 
 
A4.  Balance of payments   28
















     ( A 2 1 )  
where the parameter 0 φ > denotes the slope of the foreign bond supply schedule. 
Combined with the household sector’s flow budget constraint this yields the current 




tt t tt t t t t t tt f zp b ygpC pr b a −− Δ+ Δ− Δ = − − − +      ( A 2 2 )  
 
A5.  External Shocks and policy rules 
External shocks are assumed to follow a first-order VAR of the form 
 
2
11 ,. t t t ttt a vv E νν ν α εε ε σ − ′ =+ =      (A23) 
In the current version the vector v consists only of aid (see main text). 
 
Fiscal policy is controlled according to  
 
(1 )( ) tt dd aa δ − =− −   (A24) 
 
where δ denotes the portion of the aid inflow devoted to deficit reduction 
 
Monetary policy is defined in terms of simple linear rules for reserve intervention and 
bond sterilization. 
 
Reserve management and intervention  








− Δ−− − − ⋅ −
=− − +    (A25) 
 
where  , 0 1 ≥ α   , 0 2 > α   }, 1 , 0 { 3 ∈ α  and  . 1 0 ≤ ≤ γ  Here x  is the steady-state rate of 
depreciation, which is tied down by the long-run inflation rate, and z  is the steady-state 
level of reserves (see text for discussion).  
 
Bond operations are directly linked to the domestic liquidity expansion produced by aid. 
 
12 1 (1 )( ) ( ). tt t t p bd d b b βγ β − Δ= − − − −    (A26)   29





Intertemporal elasticity, τ   0.50 
Currency substitution elasticity, σ    2.00 
Elasticity of production substitution, nu 0.10 
Foreign currency holdings, percent of GDP (f) 0.12 
Domestic currency holdings, percent of GDP (m) 0.08 
Government securities, percent of GDP  (b)  0.09 
          o/w  domestic (foreign) percent GDP   0.08 (0.01) 
Net official reserves, percent of GDP  (z) 0.04 
Inflation rate, π (percent)  0.10 
Government spending; percent of GDP (s)   0.25 
Aid (aid shock), both percent of GDP (a)   0.10 (0.02) 
Deficit reduction share dr (δ )  0.25 
Foreign bond supply: imperfect (perfect) capital 
mobility (φ ) 
0.15 (0.001) 
Implied values:  
Nominal interest rate (i) 0.210 
Steady-state inflation elasticity of money demand  0.53 
   30
 
Table A1b.  Definition and Scaling of Variables in Simulation Runs 
Variable Definition 
Scaling of IRs and Standard 
Deviations 
In  Inflation rate = π  percentage points  
NER  Nominal exchange rate  " 
RER  Real exchange rate for imports  / I N EP P =   " 
RIR  Real interest rate  " 
I  Nominal interest rate  " 
Ca  Current account surplus including grants  percentage points of GDP 
DN   Output of non-traded goods  " 
C  Private consumption  " 
def  Budget deficit before aid   " 
dz  Reserve accumulation  " 
db   Bond sales  " 
dbp (dpf) 
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